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          The city of Hong Kong has a radically different history from its 
mother state, China. The ex-British territory was established in 1843 
amidst the Opium War, more than one century before the founding 
of communist China.29 Along with former Portuguese colony Macau, 
Hong Kong has a political system and social environment distinct from 
either Britain or China.30 The status of Special Administrative Region 
both reflected Hong Kong’s unique past and defined its role in the 
Chinese state. The historical relationship between Hong Kong and 
China was largely shaped by foreign policies on both sides.31 Only 
during the office of Governor Murray MacLehose (1971-82) did the 
city developed a new identity.32 Following the signing of Sino-British 
Joint Declaration in 1984, Hong Kong witnessed a transition of power 
in 1997 from the hands of British to the Chinese rule. The new political 
reality fundamentally transformed the dynamics of Hong Kong and 
directly led to the emergence of localist sentiment in the city.
29  C.P. Lo, Hong Kong, (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), 3.
30 For a comparative study of Hong Kong and Macau, see Sonny Shiu-hing Lo, “One 
Formula, Two Experiences: Political Divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since 
Retrocession,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no.52 (2007), pp.359-87.
31  For the major Hong Kong-China clash, see Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s 
Watershed: The 1967 Riots (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009).
32  Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui, “Revisiting the golden era of MacLehose and the dynamics 
of social reforms,” China Information 24, no.3 (2010): 249.
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          This paper discusses the emergence and development of localist 
rhetoric (本土主義) in the politics after the Handover. This paper 
defines localism in Hong Kong as a clear sense of unique identity 
distinct from Chinese nationalism. It consists of four parts, namely 
pre-Handover (1991-1997), early-SAR (1997-2005), transition (2005-
2010) and intensification (2010-present). The first part describes the era 
before the return to China. The formation of two major political camps 
after the first democratic election in 1991 coincided with massive 
population outflow due to suspicion of Chinese rule. The second part 
analyzes the administration of Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s first 
Chief Executive, who actively encouraged closer economic interaction 
with the mainland. Official bureaus also promoted Hong Kong as 
an international city. The third part outlines the legitimacy crisis of 
the government and a more hostile populace after the abrupt fall of 
Tung in 2005. A rethink and reassertion of local history and culture 
took place in the intelligentsia. Last but not least, explicit rejection of 
Chinese overlordship and the call for independence have become more 
common among the youth. A new localist force gained unprecedented 
prominence and will likely shape the political scene. 
          The first direct legislative election in 1991 marked the slow and 
tumultuous path of democratization in Hong Kong. Throughout history, 
both communist China and Taiwan regarded the British colony as an 
important point for intelligence activities. After the announcement of 
the Handover in 1984, Chinese officials put in more resources and effort 
to reach out to local elites.33 New China-friendly groups flourished 
around the late 1980s.34 On the other side of the political spectrum, 
politicians fighting for democracy gradually formed a loose coalition, 
which was labeled as the pan-democracy camp.35 The 1989 Tiananmen 
bloodbath intensified the anti-China stance of pan-democrats. Since 
the latter group won more than 85% of seats before 1997, its agendas at 
the time deserve special attention.
          A close study of various factions of the pan-democrats shows 
a delicate variation among parties. While nearly all participants of the 
elections, pan-democrat and pro-China alike, included promotion of 
democracy into their manifestos, not many concrete pledges were made. 
33  Wai-kwok Wong, “Can Co-optation Win over the Hong Kong People? China’s United 
Front Work in Hong Kong Since 1984,” Issues & Studies 33, no.5 (1997): 103.
34  A notable example is the Liberal Democratic Federation of Hong Kong.
35  Lo Shiu-hing, “The Democratic Party in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region,” The Round Table 352 (1999): 636-7.
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A major difference between the two coalitions was the attitude towards 
China. Pan-democrats were generally more unwelcoming of official 
Chinese participation in local affairs.36 Some standing candidates, like 
Emily Lau, explicitly demanded better protection of human rights.37 
The more outspoken approach was not a result of a more negative 
sentiment towards the mainland. Even for the United Democrats, the 
most radical sect of the pan-democrats, Hong Kong’s relationship with 
China was not part of its concern.38 Despite the fact that Hong Kong 
society was cautious to upcoming Chinese arrival, there was no strong 
antagonism towards China. Local identity, as seen from local politics, 
remained vague and not of the interest of the locals.
          The vibrant cultural movement coincided with the robust 
political scene. Although the Hong Kong identity was not clearly 
defined, a self-perception of uniqueness was observed among Hong 
Kong residents. A sense of cultural superiority could be easily detected 
in Hong Kong when compared with China.39 Mockery of mainlanders 
was common in movies and dramas. Many popular hits in the 90s often 
portrayed Chinese as uncivilized, backward and unintelligible. Others, 
most notably the Long Arm of the Law series (省港旗兵), described 
mainlanders as bloodthirsty, unscrupulous and savage. In some ways 
parallel to W. E. B. Du Bois’s notion of the Talented Tenth, Hongkongers 
possessed a different and sometimes competing self-identification with 
the Chinese official narrative of Chinese-ness.40
          The transfer of sovereignty shaped a new Hong Kong under 
Chinese political system. The first ethnically Chinese ruler of Hong 
Kong, Tung Chee-hwa, demonstrated a pro-China tendency. One of his 
oft-spoke lines, “when Hong Kong is good, our nation is good; when 
our nation is good, Hong Kong would be even better” (香港好，國
家好；國家好，香港更好), marked his political orientation. The 
36  Ian Scott, “An Overview of the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections of 1991,” 
Asian Journal of Public Administration 13, no. 2 (1991): 22-3.
37  Lo Shiu-hing, “Party Penetration of Society in Hong Kong: The Role of Mutual Aid 
Committees and Political Parties,” Asian Journal of Political Science 12, no. 1 (2004): 
35.
38  “Channels for Communication and Political Participation,” in A Documentary History 
of Hong Kong: Government and Politics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
1995), 228-9.
39  Rowan Callick, Comrades & Capitalists: Hong Kong since the Handover, (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 1998), 90.
40  Nan M. Sussman, Return Migration and Identity: A Global Phenomenon, A Hong 
Kong Case, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 17-8.
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signing of Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) was a product of closer interaction between 
Hong Kong and China. However, that did not imply political alignment 
with the communist state. On numerous occasions, Tung and his 
cabinet emphasized the unchanged political and economic setting of 
Hong Kong.41 Economically, the British-influenced city has become an 
integral part of the Chinese state in terms of trade and direct investment. 
Regional cooperation was advocated by both government officials and 
business leaders.42
          Economic integration did not lead to cultural convergence. 
The emphasis of critical thinking in civic education continued to 
be a preeminent theme in Hong Kong schools.43 A constant feeling 
of caution and suspicion towards China was maintained in the new 
political environment, especially since Hong Kong’s cultural context 
was more Westernized and therefore palpably different from that of its 
motherland.44 Nationalist fervor in China only received lukewarm and 
sometimes sarcastic response from Hong Kong, most notably in the 
online world.45 Even though postcolonial Hong Kong did not fall victim 
to major human rights infringement or political violence, confidence in 
Hong Kong’s future was mixed at best.46 Interestingly, persistent tension 
between Hong Kong and China did not lead to emergence of localism. 
A possible reason was perhaps the slow and stagnant development of 
civil society in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong people had become 
more engaged in local affairs, overall participation rate was much lower 
41  James T. H. Tang, “Business as Usual: the Dynamics of Government-Business 
Relations in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 8, no. 21 (1999): 276.
42  Wai-chung Lo and Michael Ng, “A Step Forward to Regionalism: China’s Preferential 
Trade Agreements with
Hong Kong,” The Chinese Economy 40, no. 2 (2007): 67-8.
43  Gregory P. Fairbrother, “Between Britain and China: Hong Kong’s Citizenship 
Education Policy Paradigm,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2006): 
37.
44  Graham E. Johnson, “Degrees of Dependency, Degrees of Interdependency: Hong 
Kong’s Changing Links to the Mainland and the World,” in Hong Kong Reintegrating 
with China: Political Cultural and Social Dimensions (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2001), 90.
45  Simon Shen, “Alternative Online Chinese Nationalism: Response to the Anti-Japanese 
Campaign in China on Hong Kong’s Internet,” Intercultural Communication Studies 
17, no. 3 (2008): 165.
46  Lau Siu-kai, “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government in the New 
Political Environment,” in Hong Kong Reintegrating with China: Political Cultural 
and Social Dimensions (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), 72.
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than other developed societies.47 Moreover, the split of pan-democratic 
alliance weakened the appeal of opposition voices.48 No new, detailed 
roadmaps on the future of Hong Kong were available on either side 
of the political arena. The underdeveloped civil society and embattled 
political parties have undoubtedly contributed to the inactive political 
and social atmosphere in Hong Kong. 
          When political independence was politically unviable and 
dramatic assimilation to China inapplicable, Hong Kong society instead 
endorsed the notion of international city. A description of “East meets 
West” was widely accepted and supported.49 Linking Hong Kong to 
the global world was favorable in the Hong Kong public sphere as 
it promoted the special status of the city, and at the same time was 
feasible for the government. Highlighting Hong Kong’s international 
standing, from the perspective of officials, would neither harm the 
overall wellbeing of the city nor provoke hawkish Chinese statesmen. 
Although the government initiative mostly focused on the economic 
aspect, it was indeed a cultural movement that served as a buffer to 
Chinese nationalism. 
          The concept of the international city and its popular reception 
merit detailed study. First articulated by Tung in 1997, the official plan 
was designed to evaluate Hong Kong’s future and its relationship to 
the outside world. A separate Commission on Strategic Development 
was established to define and realize the status of “Asia’s World City.”50 
Aiming to emulate London and New York, the framework strived 
to elevate Hong Kong to an unparalleled prestige in Asia and in the 
world.51 The Hong Kong government implemented the Brand Hong 
Kong Campaign to advertise and promote the particularities of the city 
to a global audience. The official activities, not unprecedented in the 
colonial era, were in some sense responding to the post-Handover social 
milieu of Hong Kong. Many movies and dramas in the late 1990s and 
47 Lo Shiu-hing, “Citizenship and Participation in Hong Kong,” Citizenship Studies 5, no. 
2 (2001): 139.
48 Ming Sing, “Governing Elites, External Events and Pro-democratic Opposition in 
Hong Kong (1986–2002),” Government and Opposition 38, no. 4 (2003): 472.
49 Yiu-Wai Chu, Lost in Transition: Hong Kong Culture in the Age of China, (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2013), 71.
50  For more, see Tung’s 1997 Policy Address, available on https://www.policyaddress.
gov.hk/pa97/english/booklet.htm.
51  HKSAR Government, “Asia’s World City,” HKGOV, assessed April 29, 2016, http://
www.info.gov.hk/info/sar5/easia.htm.
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early 2000s adopted an internationalized setting. The internationalist 
vision of government should be regarded as a reflection of social 
development rather than a mere top-down policy. 
          The campaign has incurable obstacles that eventually failed the 
ambitious project. Under the local mini-constitution, Hong Kong does 
not possess the power for foreign policy and national defense.52 This 
constraint severely curtailed Hong Kong official’s clout in international 
platforms. To put it in the words of former Chinese premier Zhu 
Rongji, while Shanghai should become China’s New York, Hong Kong 
would then be “China’s Toronto.”53 Furthermore, the official approach 
was only confined to regional cooperation, especially the Greater Pearl 
River Region. Places outside East Asia received minimal to nonexistent 
attention.54 In shaping the fate of the city, local officials sacrificed the 
cosmopolitan status in exchange for the character of a typical Chinese 
city.55 Hong Kong’s subordination to China, as well as the lack of global 
perspective among major officeholders, not only caused its failure in 
global marketing but also sowed the seed of discontent yet to explode. 
          The inability to solve Hong Kong’s identity crisis partly costed 
Tung his tenure. In May 2005, the first Chief Executive resigned 
amid public pressure and loss of support among elites. Donald Tsang, 
an experienced civil servant and later the Chief Secretary of Hong 
Kong, assumed office in an indirect election. Tsang’s appointment 
of assistant ministers under the new Political Appointment System 
failed to address the pressing government ineptitude and inactivity. 
While British delegated genuine power to the governor and local 
technocrats, the division of labor between the local and the Chinese 
government was not clearly drawn under the Hong Kong Basic Law.56 
Furthermore, prohibition of party affiliation in the government posed 
52 For more, see Article 18 of the Basic Law.
53 Chan Heng Wing, “Striving to be Great Cities: Reflections on the Efforts by Hong 
Kong and Singapore,” Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, assessed April 29, 2016, 
http://www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&newsarticle=117.
54  Simon Shen, “Re-branding without Re-developing: Constraints of Hong Kong’s 
‘Asia’s World City’ Brand (1997–2007),” The Pacific Review 23, no. 2 (2010): 218.
55 Agnes S. Ku, “Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong: Imagining the Local, 
the National, and the Global,” in Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 349.
56 Wai Fung Lam, “Coordinating the Government Bureaucracy in Hong Kong: 
An Institutional Analysis,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 18, no. 4 (2005): 633-4.
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challenges to the development of party politics due to Chinese concern 
of excessive clout of the Chief Executive. The awkward setting led 
to deadlock and stalemate when popularly elected parliamentarians 
clashed with “neutral” officials.57 After a decade of criticism towards 
local officials, Hongkongers were more aware of the influential Chinese 
representatives in the city. The more assertive role played by the Chinese 
Liasion Office in Hong Kong intensified the general concern of human 
rights and freedom of expression.58 The unanswered public grievances 
in local politics gradually covered other aspects and fueled a new wave 
of hostility towards the mainland. 
          Mounting political concern, after a decade of improper official 
treatment, turned into a more encompassing narrative. Growing 
economic marginalization received more attention, academic and public 
alike. In the teenage group, young adults were more resistant to their 
mainland counterparts and regarded them as potential competitors.59 
Opportunities in mainland China were projected to receive only 
lukewarm response from the future workforce.60 Among Hongkongers 
working in China, the number of employees was constantly decreasing 
in an increasing rate since 2004.61 The rejection of mainland China was 
a broader cultural product of the time. Hong Kong intellectuals in the 
mid to late 2000s were disillusioned by political stagnation and sought 
for a new path.62 The established opposition camp, as they believed, 
were corrupt and incapable in safeguarding Hong Kong. This view 
echoed the heightened antagonism towards China among the general 
public. To better illustrate the bottom-up response, I analyzed Election 
2 (黑社會:以和爲貴), a 2007 film that received both critical acclaim 
and high profit in the box office. The Johnnie To production served as 
an archetype of the anti-China sentiment prevalent among Hong Kong 
people.
57  Brian C. H. Fong, “Executive-legislative Disconnection in Post-colonial Hong Kong: 
The dysfunction of the HKSAR’s executive-dominant system, 1997-2012,” China 
Perspectives 1 (2014): 11.
58  Ma Ngok, “Democracy at a Stalemate: The September 2004 Legco Elections in Hong 
Kong,,” China Perspectives 57 (2005): 5.
59  Simon Shen, “Future Comparative Competitiveness under the Same Roof: A Survey 
of Self-Evaluation from Local and Mainland Students in Hong Kong,” Chinese 
Education and Society 45, no. 2 (2012): 49-50.
60  Zhijing yanjiuzhongxin (Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre), “Xianggang 
gaozhongsheng zenyang kan beishang jiyu” (Research Paper, Hong Kong, 2015), 6.
61  Tai-lok Lui, “Fading Opportunities: Hong Kong in the Context of Regional 
Integration,”China Perspectives 1 (2014): 37.
62  Law Wing Sang, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong 
Chinese, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 178.
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Election 2 tells a story concerning the election of a leader in a 
Hong Kong triad gang, a subject prohibited in Chinese cinema. The 
protagonist Jimmy, a mid-tier head, accepted the request from the 
deputy chief of Shenzhen police department to join the election. After 
killing other potential candidates brutally and mercilessly, he won the 
election uncontested and realized that the baton of the gang was in 
the hand of mainland police. Jimmy then returned to China only to 
be greeted by the same police he met before. The chief gave him back 
the baton, a sign of power and authority, and told him to abolish the 
election system so that he and his descendants could become the head 
forever. Jimmy, who wanted to quit the gang and become a businessman, 
had to manage the underground society for the rest of his life. The film 
ends with him putting the baton into the coffin of the former leader. 
          The contempt and hatred towards the Chinese polity are too 
distinct to hide. Linking the state with violent gang members, Election 2 
unequivocally described the Chinese Communist Party as the head of 
all triad gangs. Even the smartest and bravest fighter could not challenge 
the will of China. The fate of Hong Kong, a metaphor from that of 
Jimmy, was doomed at the beginning. Only by following the order of 
the state could Hong Kong survive. For those not suitable to the needs 
and wants of China, their only choice is either to give up their power 
or wait to be killed. With more than ten million Hong Kong dollars 
(around 1.3 million USDs) in the domestic box office and nomination as 
the Best Film in the Hong Kong Film Awards, Election 2 has presented a 
grim future not totally groundless. Although not as extreme as Johnnie 
To has portrayed, Hong Kong people’s disapproval of Chinese meddling 
in Hong Kong should not be underestimated.
A dystopian vision of Hong Kong’s future continued to 2010s. 
The contested, undemocratic Chief Executive election in 2012 brought 
in Leung Chun-ying, a hawkish political figure. The lack of progress 
in democracy, as well as a series of scandals from government officials, 
severely destroyed public trust on the existing political setting.63 The 
loss of accountability directly affected self-identification among Hong 
Kong people. The Chinese-ness of Hong Kong was more disputed than 
before.64 Discrediting the role of Chinese elements in the Hong Kong 
63  The most remarkable one is the corruption charges against Donald Tsang, suspicion of 
graft of Leung and prosecution of former Chief Secretary Rafael Hui.
64  Chan Chi Kit, “China as ‘Other’: Resistance to and ambivalence toward national 
identity in Hong Kong,”China Perspectives 1 (2014): 25.
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society, activists shifted their attention to conservation of heritage. More 
pressure groups called for better protection of Hong Kong’s unique 
cultural heritage, especially the colonial buildings and monuments.65 
Among the cases that stirred public debate, Queen’s Pier was the 
most well-known example. Built in the colonial period, the pier was 
the official arrival and departure point of Hong Kong Governors. 
The government decided to demolish the pier to give up way for a 
massive reclamation project, even after it was rated of high historical 
value.66 Whether it should be kept was soon politicized and led to 
protests and demonstrations.67 Among the laymen, the significance of 
the architecture in Hong Kong’s history justified its raison d’être.68 
Destroying the pier, in the eyes of the protesters, was equal to wiping 
out Hong Kong’s colonial history. Due to the fact that many major 
events took place around the surrounding area, Queen’s Pier should 
be properly preserved as a symbol of the past.69 The increasing public 
attention to historical preservation was a first sign of the development 
of a distinct Hong Kong identity.
          The rise of localism contributed to one of most important 
political movements in Hong Kong’s history. The Umbrella Revolution, 
which took place in major business districts and lasted for two to 
three months in late 2014, was certainly a watershed moment for 
Hong Kong. The extensive use of social media by Hong Kong youth 
radicalized and mobilized a batch of young adults to participate in a 
mass protest never seen before.70 The fresh faces that had been apolitical 
before the movement genuinely transformed local political dynamics. 
Many of them joined as a response to Chinese violation of promises 
65  Peter T. Y. Cheung, “Civic Engagement in the Policy Process in Hong Kong: Change 
and Continuity,” Public Administration and Development 31 (2011): 117.
66  Audrey Parwani, “Anger over Plan to Dismantle Pier,” South China Morning Post, 
Mar. 27, 2007.
67  Joan C. Henderson, “Conserving Hong Kong’s Heritage: The Case of Queen’s Pier,” 
International Journal of Heritage Studies 14, no. 6 (2008): 543.
68  Esther H.K. Yung and Edwin H.W. Chan, “Evaluation for the Conservation of Historic 
Buildings: Differences between the Laymen, Professionals and Policy Makers,” 
Facilities 31, no. 11/12 (2013): 552.
69  Francesca da Rimini, “Reinscribing the City: Art, Occupation and Citizen Journalism 
in Hong Kong,” Globalizations 10, no. 3 (2013): 467.
70  Paul S. N. Lee, Clement Y. K. So, and Louis Leung, “Social Media and 
Umbrella Movement: Insurgent Public Sphere in Formation,” Chinese Journal of 
Communication 8, no. 4 (2015): 370-1.
Spring 2017-2018,  Volume XLII •  27
on democracy and a disapproval of government policies.71 Despite 
the eventual failure, the groundbreaking protest overturned the post-
Handover political climate in Hong Kong. The established image of 
stable, predicted political scene was replaced with a new generation 
of more outgoing and active individuals. The old guiding principle 
of gradualism was abandoned when the youth demanded immediate 
outcomes.72 Outright challenges to Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong 
were then unimaginable, but now are relatively common. 
          The political zeal of protesters in the Umbrella Revolution did 
not transfer to the general populace. The lack of actual power made 
effort especially difficult when facing the government apparatus.73 In 
spite of the present shortcomings, a strong and persuasive ideology 
could overcome the obstacle and broaden support among different 
classes. However, a clear, coherent system of beliefs was not visible. Pro-
democracy and anti-China were the only tendencies observers could 
unearth in the movement.74 Internal discussion on the possible paths 
often went sour and caused acrimony among the more moderate wing 
and the radicals. While opposition to Chinese interference was a shared 
agenda among all participants of the Umbrella Revolution, the lack 
of further action with collective endorsement made the movement 
incomplete and unfinished. The denunciation of moderation did not 
come with an alternative strategy. 
          Some local activities bear resemblance to the nation-building 
project. Proposers and localist figures often express explicit antagonism 
to the official rhetoric and instead adopt a different set of wordings. 
Some terms, like harmony (和諧) and tolerance (包容), are now deemed 
incompatible with Hong Kong’s core values. The rejection of inclusive 
messages from the government can be put as a product of indigenous 
cultural promotion. In the eyes of localists, only by abandoning the 
impure content of Hong Kong could the true, untainted crux prevail. 
71  Karita Kan, “Occupy Central and Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong,” China 
Perspectives 3 (2013): 75.
72  Johannes Chan, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” The Round Table 103, no. 6 
(2014): 578.
73  Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement: The Protests and Beyond,” 
Journal of Democracy 26, no. 2 (2015): 115-6.
74  Po-Keung Hui and Kin-Chi Lau, ““Living in truth” versus Realpolitik: Limitations 
and Potentials of the Umbrella Movement,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 16, no. 3 
(2015): 352.
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The denunciation of anything deemed inconsistent with the Hong 
Kong values henceforth follows with the encouragement of distinctive 
localities. A discernible example is yellow umbrella. Originally a mark 
of the Umbrella Revolution, the representation of democracy, justice 
and equality are now widely adopted as a symbol of the real Hong 
Kong. It also portrays an implicit sign of rebellion. With changing use 
of words in politics and development of new worship of symbols, the 
localist movement of Hong Kong gained unparalleled momentum in 
comparison with the previous decades.  
 The Umbrella Revolution is in many ways a final culmination 
of Hong Kong’s political transformation since 1980s. Initially seen as 
apolitical, Hongkongers had a somehow vague interpretation of identity 
and nationhood. The image of international city temporarily provided 
a rallying point for the post-colonial Hong Kong society but failed 
to thrive as a broadly representative symbol. The intensification of its 
relationship with China contributed to a heightened awareness on the 
identity question and eventually led to the birth of localism. Between 
total concession to Chinese demands and outright rejection of Beijing, 
Hong Kong is divided and lacks a commonly accepted direction on its 
political future. 
The emerging localism in Hong Kong should be monitored 
through time to better capture the major features of the discourse. 
A version that called for a return to neighborhood communities 
had gained momentum in recent years and influenced government 
planning.75 Such ideas, however, have received little attention in public. 
The immense feeling of desperation and urgency, on the other hand, 
made localism a matter of survival.76 How a new localist narrative 
would form to meet the local situation requires constant observation 
and analysis. Only one point is certain: colonial Hong Kong is formally 
dead, literally and intellectually. A new version is yet to arrive.  
75  Yun-chung Chen and Mirana M. Szeto, ““The Forgotten Road of Progressive 
Localism: New Preservation Movement in Hong Kong,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 
16, no. 3 (2015): 450.
76  Stephen Ching-kiu Chan, “Delay No More: Struggles to Re-imagine Hong Kong (for 
the next 30 years),” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 334.
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